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Abstract- In this paper, we present a simple bare-bones 
solution of a Zero-Knowledge authentication protocol which uses 
non-commutative algebra and a variation of the generalized 
symmetric decomposition problem (GSDP) as a one-way function. 
The cryptographic security is assured as long the GSDP problem 
is computationally hard to solve in non-commutative algebraic 
structures and belongs currently to the PQC category as no 
quantum computer attack is likely to exists. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has achieved an 
official NIST (USA) status [1][2] and its principal purpose is to 
find cryptographic protocols that resist quantum attacks like 
Shor’s algorithm [3], which theoretically solves some one-way 
trap functions in polynomial time like the integer factorization 
problem (IFP) and the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in 
numerical fields. But this is not the only reason behind the 
development of this new kind of solutions, they pretend to 
defend against recent developments of quasi-polynomic 
algorithms for solving the low characteristic discrete logarithm 
problem [4] and to prevent attacks against pseudorandom bit 
generators [5], vastly used by current numeric field based 
algorithms of asymmetric cryptography.  
Since the beginning of the past decade, a great number of 
post-quantum proposals were formulated [6]. Among them, 
many non-commutative and non-associative algebraic solutions 
stand out [7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15] [16] [17] [18][19] 
[20][21][22][23][24].  
Zero-Knowledge authentication is fully described in 
references like [25][26][27][28][29][30], and no attempt is 
made here to explain such details. Our purpose is simply to 
present a plain sketch of a potential PQC solution. 
 
II. GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
The protocol works with the general linear group [31] 
, , were  ∈ ℤ  and p is a prime. Being a non-
commutative group, it is mandatory to find commutative 
substructures inside to develop asymmetric protocols. There 
are, beside others, three simple ways to achieve it [32].  
We use here the second way, that is the fact that two 
matrices commute iff they share the same orthogonal basis [33]. 
Suppose we start with two full ranked diagonal matrices 
and conjugate both with any non-singular same order square 
matrix; then  those similar matrices commute. 
As an example, we choose d=8 and F251 operations. An 
extensive description of 8,  is given in [32].   
 
III. GSDP PROBLEM 
The Generalized Symmetric Decomposition Problem 
(GSDP) could be stated [13] as 
 
     −       ℎ   
 "#, $% &, ' ∈ 2  ,  ∈ ℤ2 ,   )  * ∈   
%ℎ  ' = *, &  *-                                (1) 
 
Neither a polynomic-time solution for (1) is currently 
known nor any quantum computing based attack seems feasible 
is likely to exist. Of course, this statement is only a conjecture 
and is far from being proved. On the other side, no currently 
proposed and accepted PQC solution [1], has attained today a 
mathematical proved status. 
 
IV. ZKP PROTOCOL 
STEP 0 – AGREEMENT 
A community of entities (individually called provers and 
verifiers, where roles could be changed at will) agrees 
over the use the general linear group 8, . 
Definitions of M8 ,  P8 and other symbols are stated in [32]. 
Besides they agree about the following public parameters: 
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 
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                               (2) 
 
A reasonable upper limit for random integers in that space 
(d=8, p=251) could be 65536. It is of interest that each 
selected random matrix should have a high multiplicative 
order, a feature associated with the irreducibility (or better 
primitivity) of the characteristic polynomial in the simple 
algebraic extension [&] [31]. 
 
 
STEP 1 – PRIVATE AND PUBLIC KEYS 
Each entity (Alice, Bob , …) should define a private key 
generating a random diagonal matrix with non-repeating 
values chosen in ℤ
∗ .  
 
 6 7 6 " 8 … 81   ∈/   ℤ
∗          (3) 
 
And with each diagonal matrix obtained (DA, DB,…) 
generate the private key: 
 
 :, ;, …   $'" ∈   .1  
: = .<=.>, ; = .<?.>, …               (4) 
 
Clearly private keys and their powers commute. Now, 
using one-way GSDP the corresponding public keys are 
derived. 
=, ? , …  #6 $'" ∈   01  
= = :, :-, ? = ;, ;-, …               (5) 
 
STEP 2 – WITNESS (Alice as prover, Bob as verifier) 
Alice generates the witness S and sends it to Bob. 
 
$  ∈/   ℤ2 
 =  :@ ?  :>,  ⟹                        (6) 
 
STEP 3 –CHALLENGE 
Bob generates challenge bit b and question Q, and send 
both to Alice. 
 #  ∈/   {0, 1} ⟹ 
) # = 0  ℎ  F ∈/ 01    G =  ;, F ;-  ⟹ 
) # = 1  ℎ  G =  ;,   = ;-  ⟹          (7)                                                      
 
STEP 4 –RESPONSE 
Alice generates response R and sends it to Bob. 
 
)  # = 0  ℎ  H =  >, G    >-  ⟹ 
)  # = 1  ℎ  H = :>@ G  :>-  ⟹           (8) 
 
STEP 5 –IDENTITY VALIDATION 
Bob verifies response R and accepts or rejects Alice 
identity.  
)  # = 0   )  G =  , H    - 
)  # = 1   ) ? = ;>, H  ;>-          (9) 
 
If rejection occurs in the last step, Bob forces the 
repetition of steps 2 to 5 until he is fully satisfied with 
Alice’s identity. Else he rejects the prover’s identity. 
Observe that no secret keys are revealed unless GSDP is 
solved. Validation is justified according to 
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                            )  # = 1  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= ?                                                                       (10) 
If b=0, to impersonate Alice no private key is needed, as 
the fake Alice forges any S* that Bob validates. But if b=1, it is 
mandatory to use the private key of Alice to be validated. It 
would be a bad strategy for Bob to replace a random bit with 
b=1 in any round, as any entity could consistently impersonate 
Alice using a slight variation of the simulator algorithm 
[25][28], which is explained in the next section. 
 
V. ZKP CONDITION 
An interactive authentication protocol fulfills ZKP 
condition iff it complies with three properties: Completeness, 
Soundness and Zero-Knowledge [25][28]. 
The first condition could be proven considering that any 
entity  possessing Alice’s private key could be verified by Bob, 
whatever challenges he receives. So, any honest verifier will 
accept Alice’s identity. Of course, only the true Alice would be 
in condition of always providing right answers. 
The second condition implies that a dishonest prover and 
an honest verifier will fail in half of the rounds, specifically 
when he receives a b=1 challenge. Suppose Mallory is such an 
entity, he invents a random private key A* belonging to P8. If 
he receives b=0 as a challenge, it suffices to generate a random 
S* witness, as said before. But if b=1 is the challenge, he works 
out a fake witness and responses S*=A*k GB A*
-m and R*= A*-
k Q A*-n. But this will not fulfill the validation as 
 
;>, H ∗  ;>- = ;>, :∗>@ G  :∗>-  ;>- = 
=  ;>, :∗>@ ;,   = ;-  :∗>-  ;>- = 
=  ;>, :∗>@ ;, :∗@ ?  :∗>,  :, :-  ;-  :∗>-  ;>- = 
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:∗>, :, :-:∗>- ≠  ?                        (11)                         
 
Clearly the public key of Alice does not match or simplify 
the faked private key of Mallory. 
The third condition states that the protocol has the ZKP 
property iff there exists a simulator algorithm [25][28] that 
mimics valid session reports with faked values, fully 
undistinguishable from the true ones. A simulator algorithm is 
presented here. 
 
1. SELECT CHALLENGE BIT AND GENERATE A WITNESS   
Make random bit b εR [0, 1] 
If b=0  Generate random witness S=*S  εR  M8   
If b=1  Generate witness S=GB G GA-1 
2. RECEIVE CHALLENGE 
If b=0  Generate random *Q  εR  M8   
   If  b=1 Q=BmSGAB
n=BmGBG(GA
-1GA)B
n = BmGBGB
n 
3. GIVE RESPONSE  
If b=0  *R=*S-m *Q *S-n   
If b=1  R=Q 
4. VERIFY AND REGISTER SESSION 
If b=0  *Sm *R * Sn=*Q 
If b=1  B-mRB-n=(B-mBm) GBG(B
nB-n)=GBG   
Append in order the 4-tuple (S, Q, b, R) to the sesión log.. 
5. ITERATE 1. TO 4. MANY TIMES 
 
Clearly no verifier would accept the identity extracted 
from the simulation protocol as he does not generate the random 
challenge and otherwise it would verify only half of the round 
sessions. 
VI. SECURITY 
Because public keys, witness, challenge question and 
response are GSDP strong protected, a natural way to defeat 
this protocol would be a brute-force attack over the private keys 
space. The cardinal involved is: 
 
|P8 | = 249.248.247.246.245.244.243.242 = 
  =  13190481178699144320 ≈ 1019  ≈ 264              (12) 
 
This implies for (d=8, p=251) a security of 64 bits, and 
this level could be easily increased using higher dimensions. 
For example, (d=16, p=251) provides a security of 127 bits. 
Other details could be found at [29][30][32]. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is presented here a sketch of a ZKP protocol using a non-
commutative algebraic structure and Z251 arithmetic. In the 
presented protocol, the security and the hiding of the private 
elements relies on the GSDP one way function, which belongs, 
as conjectured, to the PQC family.  
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] L. Chen et al, NISTIR 8105, Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography, 
NIST,2006. http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2016/NIST.IR.8105.pdf 
(consulted February10, 2017) 
[2] D. Moody, Update on the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Project, 
2016. http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/ (consulted February10, 
2017) 
[3] P. Shor, “Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and 
discrete logarithms on a quantum computer”, SIAM J. Comput., no. 5, 
pp. 1484-1509, 1997. 
[4] R. Barbulescu, A Heuristic Quasi-Polynomial Algorithm for Discrete 
Logarithm in Finite Fields of Small Characteristic, 2016. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/239524620_A_Heuristic_Qua
si_Polynomial_Algorithm_for_Discrete_Logarithm_in_Finite_Fields_o
f_Small_Characteristic (consulted February10, 2017) 
[5] B. Schneier, The Strange Story of Dual_EC_DRBG, 2007 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_sto.html 
(consulted February10, 2017) 
[6] P. Barreto, “Introdução à criptografia pós-quântica”, Minicursos do XIII 
Simpósio Brasileiro em Segurança da Informação e de Sistemas 
Computacionais — SBSeg 2013, Cap 2, 2013. 
[7] Mahalanobis A.: The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol and non-
abelian groups, Preprint arXiv/math.gr, 0602282v3 (2007) 
[8] Shpilrain V., Zapata G.: Combinatorial group theory and public-key 
cryptography, Preprint arXiv/math.gr, 0410068 (2004) 
[9] L. Gerritzen et al (Editors), Algebraic Methods in Cryptography, 
Contemporary Mathematics, AMS, Vol. 418, 2006  
[10] B. Tsaban, Polynomial time solutions of computational problems in non-
commutative algebraic crypto, 2012. http://arxiv.org/abs/1210.8114v2, 
(consulted February10, 2017) 
[11] A. Kalka, Non-associative public-key cryptography, 2012. 
arXiv:1210.8270 [cs.CR] (consulted February10, 2017) 
[12] D. Grigoriev and I. Ponomarenko, “Constructions in public-key 
cryptography over matrix groups”, Preprint arXiv/math, no. 0506180v1, 
2005. (consulted February10, 2017) 
[13] Z. Cao, D. Xiaolei and L. Wang, “New public-key cryptosystems using 
polynomials over non-commutative rings”, Preprint arXiv/cr, 
eprint.iacr.org/2007/009.pdf, 2007. (consulted February10, 2017) 
[14] S. Paeng, D. Kwon, K. Ha and J. Kim, “Improved public-key 
cryptosystem using finite non-abelian groups”, Cryptology ePrint 
archive, Report 2001/066, 2001. (consulted February10, 2017) 
[15] J. Birget, S. Magliveras and M. Sramka, “On public-key cryptosystems 
based on combinatorial group theory”, Cryptology ePrint archive report 
2005/070, 2005. 
[16] M. González Vasco, C. Martinez and R. Steinwandt, “Towards a uniform 
description of several group based cryptographic primitives”, Designs, 
Codes and Cryptography, no. 33, pp. 215-226, 2004. 
[17] V. Shpilrain, A. Ushakov, “Thompson's group and public-key 
cryptography”, Preprint arXiv/math.gr, no. 0505487 , 2005. (consulted 
February10, 2017)  
[18] V. Shpilrain and G. Zapata, “Combinatorial group theory and public-key 
cryptography”, Preprint arXiv/math.gr, no. 0410068, 2004. (consulted 
February10, 2017) 
[19] K. Mahlburg, “An overview of braid group cryptography”, 
www.math.wisc.edu/~boston/mahlburg.pdf, 2004. (consulted 
February10, 2017) 
[20] E. Lee, “Braid groups in cryptography”, IEICE Trans. Fund., vol. E87-
A, no.5, pp. 986-992, 2004. 
[21] B. Eick and D. Kahrobaei, “Polycyclic groups: a new platform for 
cryptography”, Preprint arXiv/math.gr, no. 0411077, 2004. (consulted 
February10, 2017) 
[22] A. Mahalanobis, “The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol and non-
abelian nilpotent groups”, Preprint arXiv/math.gr, no. 0602282v3, 2007. 
(consulted February10, 2017) 
[23] V.A. Shcherbacov, Quasigroups in cryptology, Computer Science 
Journal of Moldova, 17:2, 50, 2009. 
[24] S. Magliveras, D. Stinson and T. van Trung, “New approaches to 
designing public key cryptosystems using one-way functions and 
trapdoors in finite groups”, Technical Report CORR, pp. 2000-2049, 
2000. 
[25] U. Feige, A. Fiat and A. Shamir, “Zero Knowledge proofs of identity”, 
Proceedings 19° anual ACM symposium on theory of computing, pp. 
210-217, 1987.  
[26] O. Goldreich, “Modern cryptography, probabilistic proofs and pseudo-
randomness”, Springer Verlag, 1999 
[27] T. Thomas and A. Lal, “A Zero-Knowledge undeniable signature 
scheme in non-abelian group setting”, International Journal of Network 
Security, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 265-269, 2008.   
[28] G. Simari, “A primer on zero knowledge protocols”, Universidad 
Nacional del Sur, vol. 6, no. 27, pp. 1-12, 2002.  
[29] P. Hecht, A Zero-Knowledge authentication protocol using non-
commutative groups, Actas del VI Congreso Iberoamericano de 
Seguridad Informática CIBSI’11, 96-102, 2011. 
[30] P. Hecht, Zero-Knowledge Proof Authentication using Left Self 
Distributive Systems: a Post-Quantum Approach, Actas del VIII 
Congreso Iberoamericano de Seguridad Informática CIBSI’15, 113-116, 
2015. 
[31] R. Lidl and H. Niederreiter, Finite Fields, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1997. 
[32] P. Hecht, Post-Quantum Cryptography(PQC): Generalized ElGamal 
Cipher over GF(251^8), Preprint, http://arxiv.org/abs/1702.03587, 6pp, 
2017. 
[33] T. Beth et al,, “Encyclopedia of Mathematics and its Applications”, Vol 
69: “Design Theory”, 2nd. Ed, Cambridge University Press, 1999 
 
Pedro Hecht received an MSci in Information 
Technology at Escuela Superior de Investigación 
Operativa and an PhD degree from Universidad de 
Buenos Aires (UBA). Currently, he is full 
professor of cryptography at Information Security 
Graduate School at UBA, EST (Army 
Engineering School) and IUPFA (Federal Police 
University), he is research fellow UBACyT and 
Director of EUDEBA editorial board of UBA.  
  
 
 
